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I. INTRODUCTION
 In the 2004 presidential election, a group known as Swift Boat 
Veterans for Truth released a series of television advertisements call-
ing into question the military service of Democratic candidate John 
Kerry. These advertisements disputed the honesty and patriotism of 
Senator Kerry and even challenged the legitimacy of the medals he 
earned during his service in the Vietnam War.1 The claims made in 
these advertisements were eventually exposed to be false or mislead-
ing, and they were criticized by Democratic and Republican leader-
ship alike.2 Indeed, this attack on Senator Kerry’s patriotism is one of 
the most reviled examples of dishonest partisanship in the modern 
electoral era. Nonetheless, the Swift Boat advertisements are widely 
thought to have affected the outcome of the election.3
 Swift Boat Veterans for Truth is a political organization chartered 
under section 527 of the U.S. Tax Code. These groups are funded by 
contributions from individual citizens and can spend unlimited 
amounts of money on campaign advertisements, so long as they do 
not expressly advocate the election or defeat of specific candidates.4
                                                                                                                  
 J.D. Candidate, May 2011, Florida State University College of Law. Special 
thanks to Professor Franita Tolson, my parents, and Tanya for their gracious help and 
advice in completing this Note. 
 1. The advertisements produced by Swift Boat Veterans for Truth can be found at 
the organization’s website. See TV Ads and Videos, SWIFT VETS AND POWS FOR TRUTH,
http://horse.he.net/~swiftpow/index.php?topic=Ads (last visited Mar. 18, 2011). 
 2. See, e.g., Kate Zernike & Jim Rutenberg, Friendly Fire: The Birth of an Anti-Kerry Ad,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/20/politics/campaign/20swift.html
(noting that “on close examination, the accounts of Swift Boat Veterans for Truth prove to be 
riddled with inconsistencies”). 
 3. See, e.g., Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, Conservatives Laud Swift Boat Veterans, FOX
NEWS.COM (Feb. 16, 2005), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,147728,00.html.  
 4. See 26 U.S.C. § 527 (2006). 
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In the 2004 election cycle, Swift Boat Veterans for Truth raised $27 
million worth of individual contributions, of which they spent  
$24 million.5
 While the Swift Boat Veterans were allowed to raise and spend 
these vast amounts of money on their attack ads, federal law had 
long prohibited corporations and unions from doing the same. Specif-
ically, the Federal Election Campaign Act prohibited corporations 
from using their general treasury funds to expressly advocate the 
election or defeat of a candidate, contribute directly to a candidate’s 
campaign fund, or release “electioneering communications”—
advertisements that discuss candidates for federal office but do not 
expressly advocate their election or defeat.6 These restrictions on cor-
porate spending ability were upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court on 
numerous occasions.7
 This body of campaign finance law was recently turned on its head 
by the Court’s decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Com-
mission (FEC).8 In this landmark case, the Court struck down the 
prohibitions against using corporate funds for electioneering commu-
nications and express advocacy.9 To reach this outcome, the Court 
equated the legal and actual identity of corporations and natural per-
sons under the First Amendment.10 In so doing, the Court paid hom-
age to a theory of corporate personhood known as the “natural person 
theory,” which sees the existence of human beings and corporations 
as legally and factually indistinguishable.11 The Court’s reliance on 
the natural person theory is misplaced for three major reasons: first, 
the theory is divorced from observable reality; second, the theory is 
logically incoherent; and third, the theory is inconsistent with the 
meaning and purpose of the Constitution.  
 While it is too early to discern the full impact of the Citizens Unit-
ed decision, there is much cause for concern. The potential torrent of 
corporate funding that may now enter the electoral system could re-
duce our leaders’ accountability to the larger public and undermine 
the government’s ability to hold elections free of corruption and im-
proper influence. As previously mentioned, Swift Boat Veterans for 
                                                                                                                  
 5. Scott Helman, ‘Soft Money’ Battle Brewing: Millions Raised; Attack Ads Set, BOS-
TON GLOBE (Apr. 6, 2008), http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2008/04/06/ 
soft_money_battle_brewing/ 
 6. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006). 
 7. For examples, see, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) and Austin v. Mich. 
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), discussed in Part III infra.
 8. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 9. See id. at 917. 
 10. Id. at 900.  
 11. This model is also referred to as the “natural entity” or “real entity” theory. Phillip 
I. Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an Era of Multinational Corporations, 15 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 283, 295 (1990). 
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Truth spent roughly $24 million on a series of advertisements that 
arguably affected the outcome of the election. In 2007 alone, Exxon-
Mobil reported profits of over $40 billion.12 What will happen if com-
panies of this size divert portions of their massive war chests to elec-
tioneering efforts? It is not difficult to envision the voices of average 
Americans being hopelessly drowned out.  
 Furthermore, there is no telling what other kinds of socially useful 
legislation will now be invalidated under the principle that corpora-
tions and persons have equivalent First Amendment speech rights. 
The further the Citizens United principle is extended, the more the 
federal and state governments will cede the power to regulate for the 
public good. Armed with the Citizens United precedent, industry 
leaders are now in a position to do some “swiftboating” of their own, 
and the American people are just along for the ride. 
 Part II of this Note will examine the three major legal theories of 
corporate personhood and provide examples of their use in the 
Court’s jurisprudence. Part III will examine the use of these theories 
in the Court’s campaign finance decisions. This section will attempt 
to demonstrate that the bulk of the Court’s campaign finance juris-
prudence adheres to the artificial person theory, a model that sees 
corporations and people as legally distinct and supports state regula-
tory powers.13 Part IV will examine the Citizens United decision itself 
as well as the Court’s implicit reliance on the more antiregulatory 
natural person theory. Part V of the article will expose the realistic, 
logical, and historical flaws of the natural person theory and argue 
that Citizens United was wrongly decided. Finally, Part VI will ex-
plore the potential impacts of Citizens United.
II.   LEGAL THEORIES OF CORPORATE PERSONHOOD
 Throughout its jurisprudence, the U.S. Supreme Court has util–
ized three general theories of corporate personhood: the artificial per-
son theory, the aggregate person theory, and the natural person theo-
ry. These three theories cover a wide range of ideology on the topic of 
corporate personhood. At one end of the spectrum is the artificial per-
son theory, which posits that corporations are not really persons at 
all, but rather inanimate creatures of the law.14 At the opposite end 
of the continuum is the natural person theory, which treats corpora-
tions as actual persons.15 Often, the Court’s use of these theories is 
confused or intermixed. A good example of this phenomenon is the 
                                                                                                                  
 12. David Ellis, Exxon Shatters Profit Records, CNNMONEY.COM (Feb. 1, 2008, 2:26 
PM), http://money.cnn.com/2008/02/01/news/companies/exxon_earnings/.  
 13. See Blumberg, supra note 11, at 292-93. 
 14. See id.
 15. Id. at 295. 
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Court’s holding in Hale v. Henkel.16 In one portion of the majority 
opinion, the Court held that corporations are not persons under the 
meaning of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, noting that “the corporation is a creature of the state. . 
. . presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of the public.”17 Else-
where in the opinion, the Court used the aggregate person theory18 to 
decide that corporations are people for purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment protection from unreasonable searches, stating that “[a] 
corporation is, after all, but an association of individuals under an 
assumed name and with a distinct legal entity.”19 Despite this occa-
sional confusion, however, the Court’s view on corporate personhood 
usually can be traced to one of the three major theories.  
A.   Artificial Person Theory 
 The artificial person theory (also known as the concession theory) 
is premised on the notion that corporations are fictional entities de-
pendant on the state for their existence.20 Under this model, corpora-
tions are not really people at all. Instead, their occasional classifica-
tion as people is merely a tool of economic and judicial convenience. 
The artificial person theory thus recognizes a stark distinction be-
tween tangible natural citizens and intangible business entities. Un-
der this view, a corporation is “an artificial creation of human beings 
and the law . . . . [given] personhood status solely as a legal fiction to 
facilitate commerce.”21
 A second, and perhaps more important, aspect of the artificial per-
son theory is its view of the relationship between the corporation and 
the state. Under this model, the corporation has no existence outside 
of the law; without the law’s consent, the corporation simply does not 
exist (hence the term “concession theory”).22 The artificial person the-
ory characterizes corporations as “the creation of the legislature, ow-
ing [their] existence to state action, rather than to the acts of [their] 
shareholder-incorporators.”23 The logical extension of this view is that 
corporate rights are limited to those granted in corporate charters, 
rather than those possessed by natural persons.24
                                                                                                                  
 16. 201 U.S. 43 (1906). 
 17. Id. at 74. 
 18. See Blumberg, supra note 11, at 293-94. 
 19. Hale, 201 U.S. at 76.  
 20. Susanna K. Ripken, Corporations Are People Too: A Multi-Dimensional Approach 
to the Corporate Personhood Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 97, 106-07 (2009). 
 21. Id. at 106. 
 22. Id. at 107. 
 23. See Blumberg, supra note 11, at 292. 
 24. Ripken, supra note 20, at 108 (claiming that, under the artificial person theory, 
“[w]hat the state can give, the state can take away”); see also Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 
U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 587 (1839) (noting that “[t]he only rights [a corporation] can claim are 
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 The artificial person theory was the prevailing mode of legal analy-
sis in the period between the ratification of the Constitution and the 
mid-to-late nineteenth century.25 The Court’s jurisprudence during 
this era reflected uneasiness about corporations and their ability to 
amass wealth. As such, many of the Court’s early decisions recognize 
sharp distinctions between the rights of corporations and natural per-
sons and uphold broad congressional and state regulatory powers.26
 The most prominent example of the artificial person theory in the 
entirety of the Court’s jurisprudence comes from the 1819 decision of 
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward.27 In this case, the Court 
considered the legal status of the charter of Dartmouth College. In a 
now famous passage, Chief Justice Marshall paid homage to the arti-
ficial person theory, stating that “[a] corporation is an artificial being, 
invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. . . .  
[that] possesses only those properties which the charter of its crea-
tion confers upon it.”28 Through this statement, the Court made clear 
that corporations stand on a different legal footing than natural citi-
zens; they are neither “Citizens” nor part of “We the People” as de-
scribed in the Constitution.29
 This understanding of corporate status was also reinforced by the 
Court’s early Article III jurisprudence. In this line of cases, the Court 
was tasked with determining how corporations would be allowed 
standing to sue (and be sued) on behalf of their members, given that 
Article III refers only to “Citizens.”30 In Marshall v. Baltimore and 
Ohio Railroad Company,31 the Court once again answered this ques-
tion using the artificial person theory, holding that a corporation is 
not a “citizen” but rather a legal fiction designed for jurisdictional 
purposes. Specifically, the Court held that the notion of corporate 
personhood (with respect to standing) was developed merely to pre-
vent corporations from avoiding diversity jurisdiction by placing 
shareholders in every state; instead, a corporation would be treated 
                                                                                                                  
the rights which are given to it in that character, and not the rights which belong to its 
members as citizens of a state”).  
 25. See Blumberg, supra note 11, at 292-93. 
 26. See, e.g., Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 546 (1837) 
(“[I]n grants by the public, nothing passes by implication. . . . ‘[A] corporation is strictly 
limited to the exercise of those powers which are specifically conferred on it . . . . The exer-
cise of the corporate franchise being restrictive of individual rights, cannot be extended 
beyond the letter and spirit of the act of incorporation.’ ” (quoting Beaty v. Lessee of 
Knowler, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 152, 168 (1830))). 
 27. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). 
 28. Id. at 636. 
 29. David H. Gans & Douglas T. Kendall, “A Capitalist Joker”: Corporations, Corpo-
rate Personhood, and the Constitution 4-8 (Dec. 3, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://www.theusconstitution.org/upload/fck/file/File_storage/CAC-Corporations-Narrative-
12-3-09-draft.pdf. 
 30. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 31. 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314 (1853). 
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as a separate person with a single state of residence for the purposes of 
jurisdiction.32 This limited justification for corporate personhood “would 
be the one place in which corporations were treated as citizens under 
the Constitution” in the jurisprudence of the early Court and would lay 
the foundation for many of the Court’s subsequent decisions.33
 Although the artificial entity theory fell out of favor between the 
late nineteenth century and the end of the now-reviled Lochner Era, 
it would reemerge to instruct the Court’s thinking during the New 
Deal. Struggling through the hardships of the Great Depression, a 
Court with four members appointed by Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
attempted to roll back the vagaries of the Lochner Era and reassert 
state regulatory power over corporate affairs. A good example of the 
Court’s renewed adherence to the artificial person theory is National 
Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,34 a case that 
upheld Congress’s power to regulate corporate affairs under the 
commerce clause.35 Numerous other decisions during this period 
scaled back the constitutional rights of corporations. For example, 
the New Deal Court ruled that corporate rights are necessarily less 
than those enjoyed by natural persons with regard to the self-
incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment36 and the Fourth 
Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.37
 As will be discussed, the artificial person theory would also influ-
ence much of the Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence prior to  
Citizens United.
B.   Aggregate Person Theory 
 A second theory of corporate personhood, the aggregate person 
theory, became popular with the advent of general incorporation 
statutes in the mid-to-late nineteenth century.38 This theory blurs the 
distinction between corporations and natural persons, arguing that 
corporations are best viewed as collections of individuals, rather than 
singular, fictional entities.39 In fact, the aggregate person theory pos-
                                                                                                                  
 32. Id. at 328. 
 33. See Gans & Kendall, supra note 29, at 9.  
 34. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).  
 35. See id. at 37, 49. 
 36. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944) (“The constitutional privilege against 
self-incrimination is essentially a personal one, applying only to natural individuals.”). 
 37. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950) (“[C]orporations can 
claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy. They are endowed 
with public attributes. They have a collective impact upon society, from which they derive 
the privilege of acting as artificial entities.” (citation omitted)).  
 38. See Ripken, supra note 20, at 109-10.  
 39. Id. at 110. 
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its that corporations have no existence separate from that of their 
members.40 Under this theory, a corporation: 
could not be formed without the action and agreement of human 
beings. In fact, no corporate acts would ever occur without the hu-
man persons who made up the corporate entity. Therefore, the 
corporation was seen more as a collection, or aggregate, of individ-
uals who contracted with each other to utilize the corporation for 
their mutual benefit.41
Unlike the artificial person theory, the aggregate person theo-
ry views the corporation “not [as] a creature of the state but of 
individual initiative and enterprise.”42
 Under this model, the legal rights of corporations are equated to 
the individual rights of corporate shareholders, rather than limited to 
those conceded by the legislature.43 The aggregate person theory ar-
gues that corporate property is nothing more than the collective 
property of the company’s shareholders, investors, and personnel. 
Following this logic, corporations should be regulated under the same 
property laws that govern the individuals who compose them.44 The 
aggregate person theory also posits that corporations exist for private 
(rather than public) purposes. Thus, the role of the law under this 
theory is to support corporate shareholders and to avoid interfering 
with their private actions.45 Like the natural person theory, to be dis-
cussed infra, the aggregate person theory is a fundamentally  
antiregulatory model. 
 The aggregate person theory became popular in the mid-to-late 
nineteenth century, a period characterized by popular frustration 
with the perceived legislative favoritism surrounding the award of 
corporate charters.46 During this era, “[s]pecial incorporations for 
businesses were regarded as the corrupt result of legislative bribery, 
                                                                                                                  
 40. Id.
 41. Id.
 42. Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory,
88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 185 (1985). 
 43. 1 VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 3 (Bos-
ton, Little, Brown, & Co., 2d ed. 1886) (“[I]t is essential . . . to bear in mind distinctly, that 
the existence of a corporation independently of its shareholders is a fiction; and that the 
rights and duties of an incorporated association are in reality the rights and duties of the 
persons who compose it, and not of an imaginary being.”).  
 44. See Ripken, supra note 20, at 110. 
 45. See David Millon, The Ambiguous Significance of Corporate Personhood 5 (Washing-
ton & Lee Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 01-6, 2001), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=264141 (“By appealing to the 
individual property rights of the shareholders, the aggregate idea offered a potentially useful 
theoretical justification for shielding big business from public supervision.”).  
 46. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought,
76 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1634 (1988); Ripken, supra note 20, at 109. 
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political favoritism, and monopolistic practices.”47 As such, the second 
half of the nineteenth century witnessed the spread of general incor-
poration statutes designed to allow corporations to form without the 
express consent of state legislatures.48 The Court’s jurisprudence 
shifted along with these popular sentiments, eventually adopting the 
aggregate person theory to curtail legislative regulatory authority.49
 One of the most famous judicial expositions of the aggregate per-
son theory actually comes from a district court opinion written by 
Justice Field. In the Railroad Tax Cases, a consolidation of several 
challenges to state taxation schemes, the district court held that “[t]o 
deprive the corporation of its property . . . is, in fact, to deprive the 
corporators of their property,” and, as such, corporations were to be 
treated as persons under the Fourteenth Amendment.50 Interestingly, 
the Railroad Tax decision was concerned less with the inherent 
rights of the corporation and more with the need to protect individual 
rights manifested in the corporate form. According to Justice Field:  
It would be a most singular result if a constitutional provision in-
tended for the protection of every person against partial and dis-
criminating legislation by the states, should cease to exert such 
protection the moment the person becomes a member of a corpora-
tion. . . . [T]he courts will always look beyond the name of the arti-
ficial being to the individuals whom it represents.51
 According to several legal scholars, this aggregated view of corpo-
rate personhood also informed the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company,52 which 
held that corporate property could not be taxed differently than that 
of individual citizens.53 While Santa Clara did not ultimately explore 
the issue of whether corporations are persons under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, it did clearly state that they should be treated as such 
in a footnote.54 Although this declaration could be viewed as an expo-
                                                                                                                  
 47. Ripken, supra note 20, at 109. 
 48. CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPO-
RATE BEHAVIOR 20-21 (1975). 
 49. See Ripken, supra note 20, at 110. 
 50. The Railroad Tax Cases, 13 F. 722, 747 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882).  
 51. Id. at 744.  
 52. 118 U.S. 394 (1886). 
 53. See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 46, at 1642 (“Santa Clara does not represent the 
Supreme Court's rejection of older ‘associational’ or ‘fictional’ theories of the corporation in 
favor of an ‘entity’ theory that imputed a great deal of personhood to the corporation itself. 
On the contrary, the Court relied explicitly on the idea that a corporation is an association 
of individuals. Its interests are identical to those of its shareholders. As a result, it should 
receive the same protections granted to any partnership or sole proprietorship.” (footnotes 
omitted)); see also Horwitz, supra note 42, at 223. 
 54. The Santa Clara decision is the subject of much scholarship and debate, as the 
Court never truly reached the question of whether corporations are to be treated as persons 
under the law. Instead, the court reporter, himself a former corporate executive, included 
in the transcript of the case the statement: “MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE said: The court 
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sition of the natural person theory of corporate personhood, Professor 
Horwitz explains that this theory did not emerge until several years 
after Santa Clara.55 Logically, then, the Court must have employed 
the aggregate person reasoning of the Railroad Tax Cases.
 As corporations continued to grow in size and number, the aggre-
gate person theory began to lose vitality in the Court’s jurisprudence. 
Because corporations took on so many shareholders, it became diffi-
cult to think of them as groups of homogenous, aligned individuals.56
As such, a new theory of corporate personhood would appear by the 
beginning of the twentieth century. 
C.   Natural Person Theory 
 The legal theory of corporate personhood that emerged at the be-
ginning of the twentieth century viewed corporations as actual per-
sons, dependant neither on state law nor individual shareholders for 
their existence.57 This model, known as “natural person theory” or 
“natural entity theory,” proposes that the existence of a corporation is 
no different than that of a natural-born person.58 Under the natural 
person theory, a corporation “is a full-fledged, living reality that ex-
ists as an objective fact and has a real personality in society.”59 Pro-
fessor Ripken uses the analogy of childbirth to explain the theory, 
noting that the creation of a corporation is the same as the birth of a 
natural person.60 As with a newborn baby, the state plays no part in 
birthing a corporation; rather, the state’s only role in its creation is to 
memorialize the event with a charter of incorporation (or birth certif-
icate, as it were).61 Under the natural person theory, a corporation is 
not the product of legislative consent but “simply a natural out-
growth of the economic tendency toward business combination.”62 As 
such, the corporation is not an artificial entity but rather a naturally 
existing person “which has compelled the law to grant it official rec-
                                                                                                                  
does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the provision in the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution . . . applies to these corporations. We are all of opinion that 
it does.” Santa Clara, 118 U.S. at 396. Many wonder whether this statement was ever 
made at oral argument, or if it was part of a larger “conspiracy” to smuggle the notion of 
corporate personhood into constitutional dialogue. For more reading on this subject, see 
Howard Jay Graham, The “Conspiracy Theory” of the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 YALE L.J. 
371 (1938) [hereinafter Graham, The Conspiracy Theory I]; Howard Jay Graham, The 
“Conspiracy Theory” of the Fourteenth Amendment: 2, 48 YALE L.J. 171 (1938). 
 55. Horwitz, supra note 42, at 183. 
 56. Ripken, supra note 20, at 111-12.  
 57. Id. at 112. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id.
 60. Id. at 112-13. 
 61. Id.
 62. Id. at 113.  
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ognition.”63 The natural person theory diverges from the aggregate 
person theory with respect to its view of the relationship between 
corporation and shareholder. Under the natural person theory, corpo-
rations exist separately from the lives of their shareholders and not 
because of them. In other words, the natural entity theory argues 
that corporations actually are persons—not just that they should be 
treated as such to protect the rights of their shareholders. Natural 
entity theorists are quick to point out that corporations have perpet-
ual lives that outlast those of individual shareholders and that corpo-
rate actions cannot be said to be the product of any one person.64 As 
such, corporations are persons as much as you and I, and have “the 
same legal, social, and moral responsibilities that natural persons 
carry, as well as the same rights and protections.”65
 The natural person theory gained popularity in the early twenti-
eth century and was the primary mode of analysis in the now infa-
mous Lochner Era. This period of legal history is characterized by the 
Court’s adherence to a laissez-faire economic philosophy anchored by 
the “liberty of contract,” a concept with almost no constitutional 
mooring.66 Fearful of the “present assault upon capital,” an increas-
ingly conservative and business-friendly Court began using the no-
tion of corporate personhood to infuse businesses with the individual 
rights necessary to challenge state and federal regulations.67 The 
Court’s decision in Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Ellis68
provides a useful example. This case concerned a state law requiring 
railroad companies to pay their opponents’ legal fees, an obligation 
not placed on natural citizens or other types of businesses.69 In de-
termining that this restriction violated the Equal Protection Clause, 
the Court essentially declared it unconstitutional for the legislature 
to differentiate between corporations and persons. Citing the infa-
mous Santa Clara footnote, the Court held that “corporations are 
persons within the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . . A 
State has no more power to deny to corporations the equal protection 
of the law than it has to individual citizens.”70 The language of this 
holding is telling. The Court did not hold that corporations should 
                                                                                                                  
 63. W. Jethro Brown, The Personality of the Corporation and the State, 21 L.Q. REV.
365, 370 (1905).  
 64. See id. at 366-72. 
 65. Ripken, supra note 20, at 102; see also Julie Marie Baworowsky, Note, From Pub-
lic Square to Market Square: Theoretical Foundations of First and Fourteenth Amendment 
Protection of Corporate Religious Speech, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1713, 1738 (2008) (de-
scribing the natural entity theory as inherently antiregulatory). 
 66. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 67. Gans & Kendall, supra note 29, at 24 (quoting Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust 
Co., 157 U.S. 429, 607 (1895) (Field, J., concurring)). 
 68. 165 U.S. 150 (1897). 
 69. Id. at 152-53. 
 70. Id. at 154.  
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enjoy constitutional protections to vindicate the rights of their share-
holders but instead determined that corporations are individuals in 
and of themselves. This is arguably the most lucid exposition of the 
natural person theory in all of the Court’s jurisprudence.  
 Subsequent Lochner Era decisions further undermined legisla-
tures’ ability to distinguish between the existence of corporations and 
natural persons. In Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, for example, the 
Court struck down a minimum wage law,71 noting that a corporation 
such as the petitioner hospital has a constitutional right to “obtain . . 
. the best terms . . . as the result of private bargaining,”72 and, implic-
itly, that the constitutional right to such “liberty of contract” is the 
same for both natural persons and corporations.73
 While this extreme adherence to the natural person theory would 
meet its demise with the end of the Lochner Era, it still occasionally 
finds its way into the Court’s opinions. As will be discussed, this the-
ory has risen again to inform the Court’s decision in Citizens United.
III.   CORPORATE PERSONHOOD IN THE COURT’S CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
JURISPRUDENCE
 The Court’s corporate personhood jurisprudence, with respect to 
questions of free speech and campaign spending, largely adheres to 
the artificial person theory. With one exception, the Court’s decisions 
prior to Citizens United recognize both a distinction between the 
First Amendment rights of corporations and persons as well as the 
need for legislative regulation of corporate spending abilities.74 Before 
examining the relevant precedent, however, a word about the Court’s 
decision in Buckley v. Valeo75 is necessary. 
 The Court’s landmark decision in Buckley v. Valeo established the 
basic framework upon which all of the Court’s subsequent campaign 
finance jurisprudence is based. In this case, the Court was tasked 
with reviewing the constitutionality of the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act (FECA).76 In order to curb the influence of private spending 
on elections and political accountability, this act established limits on 
both direct campaign contributions as well as independent campaign-
related expenditures.77 Before reaching the constitutionality of the 
act, however, the Court was first faced with an even more fundamen-
tal question: is spending money a form of speech protected by the 
                                                                                                                  
 71. 261 U.S. 525, 539, 562 (1923). 
 72. Id. at 545. 
 73. Gans & Kendall, supra note 29, at 28. 
 74. The exception being First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), 
discussed infra notes 98-104 and accompanying text. 
 75. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 76. Id. at 6. 
 77. See id. at 7. 
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First Amendment? The Court answered in the affirmative, holding 
that the expenditure of money is essential to “the ability of candi-
dates, citizens, and associations to engage in protected political ex-
pression.”78 As such, the spending limitations of FECA were subjected 
to strict scrutiny review.79 The direct contribution limits established 
in FECA withstood this review; the Court recognized a compelling 
state interest in curtailing the potential corruption that might be 
caused by limitless donations to a candidate’s election fund.80 The 
independent expenditure limits, conversely, were held to be unconsti-
tutional.81 The Court reasoned that this restriction was too attenuat-
ed from the problem of improper influence that FECA was designed 
to curtail.82 It is important to note, however, that Buckley only con-
sidered restrictions placed on natural citizens. Federal law after 
Buckley maintained similar expenditure limitations on corporations, 
and until Citizens United, these restrictions were upheld.83    
 The limitations placed on corporate spending ability were upheld 
largely because the modern Court has generally adhered to the artifi-
cial person theory of corporate personhood. With the exception of 
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,84 the Court’s campaign fi-
nance decisions recognize that “the special characteristics of the cor-
porate structure require particularly careful regulation” to circum-
vent the potential for corruption and improper influence in the elec-
toral system.85 In repeatedly upholding the power of Congress to reg-
ulate corporate election spending, the Court clearly delineated be-
tween the legal identities of corporations and persons, as such re-
strictions would not otherwise be permissible under Buckley.
 One of the premier examples of the artificial person theory in the 
Court’s campaign finance decisions comes from Austin v. Michigan 
State Chamber of Commerce.86 This case considered the constitution-
ality of a state law prohibiting corporations from using their general 
treasury funds to advocate the election or defeat of a candidate with-
in a certain timeframe.87 The Court recognized a compelling govern-
ment interest in preventing corporate dominance of the electoral pro-
cess and thus upheld the restriction.88 The seminal statement 
                                                                                                                  
 78. Id. at 59. 
 79. Id. at 44-45. 
 80. Id. at 23-38, 58-59. 
 81. Id. at 58-59. 
 82. Id. at 45-51. 
 83. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006). 
 84. See discussion infra notes 98-104 and accompanying text. 
 85. Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 209-210 (1982). 
 86. 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
 87. Id. at 654-55.  
 88. Id. at 659 (“[T]he compelling governmental interest in preventing corruption sup-
port[s] the restriction of the influence of political war chests funneled through the corpo-
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from the case belies the Court’s adherence to the artificial person 
theory:  
State law grants corporations special advantages—such as limited 
liability, perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumula-
tion and distribution of assets—that enhance their ability to at-
tract capital . . . . These state-created advantages not only allow 
corporations to play a dominant role in the Nation’s economy, but 
also permit them to use “resources amassed in the economic mar-
ketplace” to obtain “an unfair advantage in the political market-
place.”89
It was apparent to the Austin Court that corporations could not hope 
to enjoy these special state-created privileges as well as the constitu-
tional protections afforded to natural-born citizens. The opposite re-
sult would allow the “corrosive and distorting effects of immense ag-
gregations of wealth” to play an unfair role in the electoral process.90
 The Austin “anti-distortion” rationale was subsequently upheld in 
McConnell v. FEC,91 a case that directly considered the constitution-
ality of the federal Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) at issue 
in Citizens United.92 Congress passed BCRA in response to concerns 
about the amount of corporate spending on independent attack ads 
that escaped the restrictions of FECA.93 BCRA attempted to close the 
FECA loophole by outlawing the use of corporate funds on “election-
eering communications,” a form of campaign advertising that does 
not expressly advocate the election or defeat of a candidate for of-
fice.94 Recognizing the “unusually important interests [that] underlie 
the regulation of corporations’ campaign-related speech,”95 the Court 
again approved the law’s distinction between the First Amendment 
rights of corporations and natural persons.96 This holding is consis-
tent with the artificial person theory; if the Court considered corpora-
tions as persons (or even as aggregate persons) the spending restric- 
tion would constitute an impermissible restriction on speech rights 
under Buckley. This congressional power to distinguish between hu-
                                                                                                                  
rate form.” (quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 
470 U.S. 480, 500-01 (1985))). 
 89. Id. at 658-59 (quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 
U.S. 238, 257 (1986)). 
 90. Id. at 660. 
 91. 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
 92. Id. at 93. 
 93. See id. at 207.  
 94. See id. at 93-94. 
 95. Id. at 206 n.88. 
 96. See id. at 207. 
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man beings and corporations for purposes of campaign spending was 
upheld as recently as 2007.97
 The major exception to the Court’s recognition of the artificial per-
son theory is First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti.98 This case 
concerned a state limitation on a corporation’s ability to spend money 
on advertisements related to ballot referendums.99 Here, the Bellotti 
Court rejected any distinction between corporations and persons and 
instead held that corporations have a First Amendment right to 
spend money on advertisements that advocate the passage or defeat 
of referenda.100 The major premise of Bellotti—one that would under-
lie the Court’s decision in Citizens United—is that the First Amend-
ment does not tolerate discrimination among speakers, at least with 
respect to political speech.101 Interestingly, the Court stopped short of 
fully adopting free speech rights for corporations. This is largely be-
cause the Court’s precedents in this field do not provide much sup-
port for that position. Instead, the Court focused on the First 
Amendment rights of the listener, rather than those of the speaker.  
As Justice Powell explained, “[t]he inherent worth of the speech in 
terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon 
the identity of its source, whether corporation . . . or individual.”102
 Bellotti is distinct from much of the Court’s campaign finance ju-
risprudence because it relies partially on the natural person theory. 
In holding that the First Amendment does not tolerate speaker dis-
crimination based on corporate status, the Court implied that the 
corporate identity is no different than that of a natural-born citizen. 
Further, the Bellotti Court curtailed congressional regulatory powers 
in the name of corporate personhood. Clearly, this holding is in line 
with the antiregulatory natural person theory. 
 The Bellotti majority took care to distinguish its decision from 
other pertinent precedent, noting that spending restrictions are at-
tenuated from the goal of preventing electoral corruption in the case 
                                                                                                                  
 97. See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 457 (2007). 
Declining to overturn Austin or McConnell, the Right to Life Court held that corporations 
could not use general treasury funds to release political advertisements “susceptible of no 
reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candi-
date.” Id. at 470. While this decision weakened the regulatory authority of Congress in the 
area of corporate campaign finance, it did not eliminate it.  
 98. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
 99. Id. at 768-69. 
 100. Id. at 786-92. 
 101. Id. at 784-85. (“In the realm of protected speech, the legislature is constitutionally 
disqualified from dictating the subjects about which persons may speak and the speakers 
who may address a public issue.”). 
 102. Id. at 777. 
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of ballot referenda.103 Indeed, the notion of improper corporate pur-
chase of political influence does not seem relevant to the case of an 
inanimate ballot initiative which cannot become indebted to any one 
candidate. This explains why Bellotti was not overruled by the sub-
sequent decisions in Austin or McConnell; the antidistortion ra-
tionale espoused in Austin applied only to elections for representative 
office. Thus, the logic of Bellotti was not meant to extend beyond its 
narrow context, and until Citizens United, it was not.104
IV.   CITIZENS UNITED AND CORPORATE PERSONHOOD
Citizens United v. FEC105 concerned the application of federal cam-
paign finance law to a film entitled Hillary: The Movie (hereinafter 
Hillary). Citizens United, a private nonprofit corporation, attempted to 
release the film through video-on-demand within thirty days of a 2008 
Democratic Party primary election, potentially in contravention of 2 
U.S.C. § 441b, which governs corporate electoral spending.106 As such, 
Citizens United sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the 
FEC, preventing application of the law to its video.107
 Prior to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), corpora-
tions were barred under § 441b from using their general treasury 
funds to make direct contributions to candidates or to finance inde-
pendent materials that expressly advocated the election or defeat of a 
candidate.108 BCRA section 203 added to these restrictions, prevent-
ing corporations from using their general funds to support “election-
eering communication[s].”109 Electioneering communications are de-
fined as “any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication” that “re-
fers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office” and is made 
within thirty days of a primary or sixty days of a general election.110
In order to ameliorate the harshness of these restrictions, § 441b in-
cludes a provision allowing corporations to engage in express advoca-
cy and electioneering communication through “Political Action Com-
mittees.”111 These bodies, funded solely through “donations from 
                                                                                                                  
 103. See id. at 787-92; see also id. at 790 (“Referenda are held on issues, not candidates 
for public office. The risk of corruption perceived in cases involving candidate elections 
simply is not present in a popular vote on a public issue.” (citations omitted)). 
 104. Adam Winkler, Corporate Personhood and the Rights of Corporate Speech, 30 SEAT-
TLE U. L. REV. 863, 869 (2007) (“Indeed, in each subsequent case Bellotti was not treated as a 
landmark but relegated to a footnote, distinguished away and limited to its particular facts.”). 
 105. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).  
 106. Id. at 887. 
 107. Id. at 888. 
 108. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006). 
109. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887. 
 110. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A) (2006).  
 111. § 441b. 
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stockholders and employees of the corporation,” are segregated funds 
exempted from the aforementioned spending restrictions.112
 Hillary ostensibly fell under the purview of § 441b.113 Citizens 
United attempted to release the video using its general corporate 
funds within the prohibited thirty-day window described by the stat-
ute.114 Furthermore, the movie specifically referred to then-Senator 
Hillary Clinton, potentially triggering the prohibition against elec-
tioneering communications, although it was not initially clear that 
materials released through video-on-demand would qualify as such.115
 In an attempt to defeat application of this statute to Hillary, Citi-
zens United brought a series of as-applied challenges to § 441b. For 
example, Citizens United argued that Hillary did not qualify as an 
electioneering communication116 and that it did not constitute express 
advocacy.117 Despite the fact that Citizens United waived its facial 
constitutional challenge to § 441b, the Court decided to consider it 
sua sponte, noting that “the Court cannot resolve this case on a nar-
rower ground without chilling political speech.”118
 Using Bellotti as its ammunition, the Citizens United Court struck 
down § 441b, Austin, and McConnell.119 In so doing, it set forth one of 
the most lucid expositions of the natural person theory of corporate 
personhood since the Lochner Era. The Court’s opinion is replete 
with statements that equate the legal and actual identity of corpora-
tions and natural persons. The Court’s oft-repeated mantra is that 
“the Government cannot restrict political speech based on the speak-
er’s corporate identity” under the strictures of the First Amend-
ment.120 The implication of this statement is clear: the identity of a 
corporation is no different than that of a natural person for purposes 
of the First Amendment. Citing Bellotti, a case not meant to apply 
outside the context of voter referenda, the majority claimed that 
“[t]he Court has thus rejected the argument that political speech of 
corporations or other associations should be treated differently under 
the First Amendment simply because such associations are not ‘natu-
                                                                                                                  
 112. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 888.  
113. See id. at 890. 
 114. Id. at 888. 
 115. Id. at 887-88. For instance, the Code of Federal Regulations describes electioneer-
ing communications as “publicly distributed” materials that “[c]an be received by 50,000 or 
more persons.” 11 C.F.R. § 100.29(b)(3)(ii) (2010). It is not clear that video-on-demand, 
which can be viewed only upon purchase or request of the viewer, fits this definition.  
 116. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 888-89. 
 117. Id. at 889-90. 
 118. Id. at 892. 
 119. See id. at 913. 
 120. Id. at 902; see also, e.g., id. at 898 (“Prohibited, too, are restrictions distinguishing 
among different speakers, allowing speech by some but not others.”); id. at 899 (“[T]he Govern-
ment may commit a constitutional wrong when by law it identifies certain preferred speakers.”). 
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ral persons.’ ”121 These statements demonstrate the Court’s adherence 
to the natural person theory. By refusing to recognize a distinction 
between the identities of corporations and persons, the Court is clear-
ly focused on the speech rights of the corporation itself, rather than 
the aggregated speech rights of corporate shareholders.122 According 
to the Citizens United Court, the corporation should be treated as a 
person because it actually is one.  
V.   THE ILLOGIC OF CITIZENS UNITED AND THE NATURAL 
ENTITY THEORY
 As previously discussed, the Citizens United Court reached its de-
cision using a mode of analysis consistent with the natural person 
theory, which recognizes no distinction between corporation and per-
son and posits that both are entitled to identical constitutional 
rights. This Court’s reliance on this theory is misplaced for a number 
of reasons. Specifically, the natural person theory contravenes ob-
servable reality, logic, and our nation’s legal history. 
 To begin with, the natural person theory contradicts plainly ob-
servable realities. Simply put, corporations are not people.123 They 
have no physical form. They do not walk, talk, breathe, or engage in 
any number of human activities. They have no feelings or thoughts. 
“As a non-human entity, a corporation lacks the expressive interests 
related to self-actualization and freedom that human beings possess 
by virtue of being human.”124 Having a conversation with a corpora-
tion would be akin to having a conversation with a wall, as neither 
possesses the hands to write, the vocal chords to speak, the limbs to 
gesture, or the mind to engage in independent, expressive thought. 
As Justice Rehnquist put it, “[t]o ascribe to such artificial entities an 
‘intellect’ or ‘mind’ for freedom of conscience purposes is to confuse 
metaphor with reality.”125 The natural person theory ignores this 
most essential distinction between corporations and persons and is 
thus fundamentally flawed. 
 Even aside from its obvious realistic deficiencies, the natural per-
son theory is logically incoherent. The theory posits that corporate 
                                                                                                                  
 121. Id. at 900 (citing First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978)). 
 122. It is worth noting that the opinion does not include much, if any, language defend-
ing the corporate right to political speech on grounds of the aggregate person theory. The 
only statement which does seem to reflect the thinking of the aggregate person theory 
complains that, under § 441b, “certain disfavored associations of citizens—those that have 
taken on the corporate form—are penalized for engaging in . . . political speech.” Id. at 908. 
 123. See, e.g., Tamara R. Piety, Against Freedom of Commercial Expression, 29 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2583, 2668 (2008) (“Corporations are not human beings. They only have 
the qualities and the rights given to them by law, no more, no less.”). 
 124. Id. at 2646. 
 125. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 33 (1986) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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existence depends neither upon state law nor upon the collective ef-
forts of shareholders; instead corporations have lives of their own and 
are merely the product of the natural tendency toward business asso-
ciation.126 This too is clearly false. Corporations still depend upon in-
corporation statutes for their recognition and the conferred benefits 
they enjoy. Natural person theorists often claim that the perpetual 
life of corporations evidences their separate existence as natural per-
sons.127 This argument, however, misses a larger point—corporations 
would not be entitled to benefits such as perpetual life but for state 
law. Thus, state legislatures, which can always amend incorporation 
statutes, have the final word as to how and when corporations form 
and what benefits they receive. So too are corporations dependent on 
the individuals who comprise them. While it may be true that incor-
poration is a natural tendency in a free market, to suggest that cor-
porations have identities separate from those of their makers is ludi-
crous. Without actual people to associate, pool resources, develop 
business models, and file necessary paperwork, corporations would 
never exist; without Bill Gates, there would be no Microsoft. Taken to 
its logical extreme, the natural person theory might suggest that cor-
porations have no need of such officers or employees, since they are 
actual persons themselves, capable of making decisions and speaking 
their minds. This is clearly as unrealistic as it is illogical.  
 The natural person theory also runs afoul of our nation’s legal his-
tory. The framers of the Constitution would almost certainly reject 
the notion that corporations are among “We the People” for whom the 
Constitution was written.128 The Founders saw corporations as dan-
gerous entities to be tightly regulated by the state and granted only 
those rights listed in their chartering documents, rather than those 
enumerated in the Constitution.129 This notion is reinforced by the 
language of the Constitution itself, which protects rights that apply 
awkwardly to the corporate context. Indeed, it is difficult to envision 
corporations engaging in the “freedom of speech,” enjoying the right 
to “peaceably . . . assemble,” practicing the “free exercise” of reli-
gion,130 or “keep[ing] and bear[ing] Arms.”131 These are fundamentally 
human rights, and to apply them to the corporate setting is to mis-
read the Constitution. 
                                                                                                                  
 126. See supra Part II.C. 
 127. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.  
 128. See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1949 (3d sess. 1791) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (state-
ment of Rep. James Madison), available at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/ampage?collId=llac&fileName=002/llac002.db&recNum=278 (“[A] charter of incorpora-
tion . . . creates an artificial person previously not existing in law. It confers important civil 
rights and attributes, which could not otherwise be claimed.”). 
 129. Gans & Kendall, supra note 29, at 4-8. 
 130. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 131. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
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 Even the Fourteenth Amendment, the hook upon which the notion 
of corporate personhood would eventually hang, was not intended to 
apply to corporations. Instead, this amendment, adopted after the 
Civil War, was designed to safeguard the expanded grant of citizen-
ship to freed slaves.132 Like the Bill of Rights, the language of the 
Fourteenth Amendment suggests a narrow applicability to living 
persons. The citizenship clause of the amendment, for example, re-
fers to “persons born or naturalized in the United States.”133 Of 
course, a corporation cannot be born or naturalized, so a plain read-
ing of the Fourteenth Amendment suggests that it was not intended 
to include artificial entities within its scope. The debates over the 
Fourteenth Amendment further reinforce this conclusion; in fact, 
these debates are devoid of even a single reference to the protection 
of corporations.134 Representative John Bingham, the amendment’s 
primary author, explained that the purpose of the amendment was to 
ensure that “no man, no matter what his color, no matter beneath 
what sky he may have been born . . . shall be deprived of life or liber-
ty or property without due process of law.”135 Clearly, the drafters of 
our Constitution had little trouble distinguishing between the rights 
of corporations and those of natural persons, unlike those who would 
support the natural person theory. Indeed, the notion that corpora-
tions are people under the Constitution did not become a part of our 
country’s legal tradition until the infamous Santa Clara footnote, and 
thus entered constitutional dialogue “without argument, without jus-
tification, without explanation, and without dissent.”136
 The Court’s opinion in Citizens United employs a theory of corpo-
rate personhood that is divorced from reality, logic, and the intent of 
the framers. Considerations of stare decisis aside,137 the Court ar-
                                                                                                                  
 132. See Gans & Kendall, supra note 29, at 12-15; see also Winkler, supra note 104, at 
865 (“Although corporations were widespread and well known at [the time of the Four-
teenth Amendment’s drafting], the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend 
to grant corporations these rights.” (footnote omitted)). 
 133. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 134. See Graham, The Conspiracy Theory I, supra note 54, at 385-92 (analyzing the 
text of the congressional debates regarding the Fourteenth Amendment).  
 135. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1094 (1866), available at 
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwcglink.html#anchor39. This interpretation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment was likewise recognized by the Court, which held that “[t]he term 
citizens . . . applies only to natural persons, members of the body politic, owing allegiance to 
the State, not to artificial persons created by the legislature, and possessing only the attrib-
utes which the legislature has prescribed.” Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 177 (1868). 
 136. Winkler, supra note 104, at 865. 
 137. Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion lambastes the majority for its purportedly 
improper treatment of stare decisis. Stevens claims that the constitutional issue was not 
properly before the court and that, even assuming it was, the case could have been resolved 
on a number of narrower grounds, obviating the need to reach the constitutional question. 
According to Stevens, “[t]he only thing preventing the majority from affirming the District 
Court, or adopting a narrower ground that would retain Austin, is its disdain for Austin.” 
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 938 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissent-
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rived at the wrong conclusion in equating the First Amendment 
rights of corporations and natural beings. 
VI.   THE IMPACT OF CITIZENS UNITED
 At first glance, there is some reason to believe that the practical 
impact of Citizens United may be somewhat limited. To begin with, 
the now invalidated sections of § 441b pertaining to electioneering 
communications were somewhat limited in scope. Although the ma-
jority opinion attempted to characterize § 441b as a complete ban,138
the reality is that the restrictions on electioneering materials operat-
ed only during a relatively short period immediately preceding elec-
tions. Corporations were already free to use their general treasury 
funds to support electioneering materials outside of that window. 
Furthermore, corporate PACs were completely exempt from this pro-
hibition and could release electioneering materials at any time of 
their choosing. Many of these PACs are almost as well-funded and 
capable as the corporations themselves. Justice Stevens notes in his 
dissent that PACs raised nearly a billion dollars in the 2008 election 
cycle.139 Thus, the limited nature of § 441b suggests that corporations 
may not have gained much through its invalidation.  
 Even aside from these considerations, there is some support for 
the position that corporate campaign spending is relatively slight in 
our elections. A 2003 study that examined corporate PAC spending 
found that individual donor expenditures still constitute the vast ma-
jority of campaign spending.140 The study notes that individual citi-
zen expenditures in the 2000 presidential election totaled nearly $2.4 
billion, compared to only $380 million worth of corporate general 
treasury expenditures.141 The study also concludes that there is little 
statistical correlation between corporate campaign expenditures and 
favorable voting behavior in Congress.142 Still other studies claim 
that corporate expenditures are actually correlated with negative 
economic returns, a phenomenon which, if true, may dissuade corpo-
rations from making large election expenditures altogether.143 Taken 
                                                                                                                  
ing). “The only relevant thing that has changed since Austin and McConnell is the composi-
tion of this Court.” Id. at 942. Stevens also criticizes the majority’s extensive reliance on 
Bellotti, a case easily distinguished from Citizens United. See id. at 958-61. 
 138. See id. at 911. 
 139. Id. at 942 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 140. Stephen Ansolabehere, John M. de Figueiredo & James M. Snyder, Jr., Why Is 
There So Little Money in U.S. Politics?, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 105, 108 (2003). 
 141. Id.
 142. Id. at 112-17. 
 143. See Rajesh K. Aggarwal, Felix Meschke & Tracy Wang, Corporate Political Con-
tributions: Investment or Agency? (EFA 2008 Athens Meetings Paper, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=972670.  
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together, these facts suggest that the impact of Citizens United may 
be less sweeping than some fear.   
 While it is true that corporations have spent relatively little 
through their PACs, this ultimately should not be of much consola-
tion to the concerned citizen. Citizens United has drastically altered 
the face of campaign finance law and has created some uncertainty 
about corporate behavior moving forward. Now that large corpora-
tions do not have to bother establishing PACs or navigating FEC 
regulations, it is highly plausible that they will engage in more 
spending.144 Furthermore, large corporations possess tremendous 
wealth that can be easily mobilized; even the best-funded PACs could 
not truly hope to reach such levels of funding. As previously men-
tioned, Exxon Mobil generated profits of over $40 billion in 2008 
alone.145 With even a marginal investment of some of these proceeds, 
it could easily outspend the entire Obama campaign, itself historic 
for shattering previous funding records by raising $750 million.146
The aforementioned studies which discuss the dearth of corporate 
PAC spending in American elections may become irrelevant in this 
new age where corporations do not need to establish segregated 
funds for their campaign spending efforts.   
 Should corporate money enter the electoral system in such vol-
umes, it may become impossible for natural citizens to influence the 
course of political debate. How could an advocacy group like Swift 
Boat Veterans for Truth or Moveon.org, let alone an individual citi-
zen, possibly hope to influence thought about political issues if forced 
to compete with the vast resources of corporate titans? “[W]hen cor-
porations grab up the prime broadcasting slots on the eve of an elec-
tion, they can flood the market with advocacy that bears ‘little or no 
correlation’ to the ideas of natural persons or to any broader notion of 
the public good . . . .” 147 This reality poses a threat not only to the 
value of First Amendment rights possessed by actual persons but al-
so to democratic participation itself, as average citizens may feel dis-
couraged from engaging in a system dominated by corporate inter-
ests. “Take away Congress’ authority to regulate the appearance of 
                                                                                                                  
 144. This Note was written several months before the 2010 midterm elections.  Now 
that those elections have occurred, it is possible to begin evaluating this prediction.  Cam-
paign spending did indeed rise dramatically in the 2010 midterms; the Center for Respon-
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undue influence and ‘the cynical assumption that large donors call 
the tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part in 
democratic governance.’ ”148
 A related concern is democratic responsiveness: how will the lead-
ership and decisions of our elected officials be affected by this poten-
tial new influx of campaign money? Presumably, our representatives 
will feel more indebted to the corporation that spends $500 million on 
favorable electioneering material than they will to the middle-class 
parent who donates $50. The evidence amassed by Congress in con-
sidering the adoption of BCRA section 203 suggests that this is in-
deed a real problem. The congressional record indicates that corpo-
rate sponsors of favorable issue ads “were routinely granted special 
access [to elected officials] after the campaign was over.”149 One for-
mer Senator candidly admitted this reality, noting that “[c]andidates 
whose campaigns benefit from [phony “issue ads”] greatly appreciate 
the help of these groups. In fact, members will also be favorably dis-
posed to those who finance these groups when they later seek access 
to discuss pending litigation.”150 This phenomenon becomes even 
more troubling when one considers the broad language used in the 
majority opinion, which could be employed by foreign corporations to 
gain access to our electoral system. As Justice Stevens explains: 
If taken seriously, [the majority’s] assumption that the identity of 
a speaker has no relevance to the Government’s ability to regulate 
political speech would lead to some remarkable conclusions. Such 
an assumption would have accorded the propaganda broadcasts to 
our troops by “Tokyo Rose” during World War II the same protec-
tion as speech by Allied commanders. More pertinently, it would 
appear to afford the same protection to multinational corporations 
controlled by foreigners as to individual Americans . . . .151
Such an application of Citizens United would dramatically under-
mine the ability of natural-born Americans to be heard and the will-
ingness of elected representatives to listen.  
 A potentially larger danger of Citizens United is simply the prece-
dent it sets. Simply put, constitutional rights are extremely difficult 
to retract once granted: “Having once named the corporate form as a 
‘person,’ it may be difficult to turn back.”152 We do not know how 
many other useful state and federal laws will now be invalidated 
based on the holding of Citizens United. The Court’s decision to 
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equate the identity of corporations and persons “may have serious 
implications for the government’s ability to regulate in the public in-
terest, which may in turn have negative social consequences for 
health, safety, and general welfare.”153 For example, a state law pro-
hibiting out-of-state corporations from spending money on domestic 
elections, a seemingly reasonable restriction, may now be invalid un-
der the holding of Citizens United. What effect might Citizens United
have on judicial elections or judicial independence more generally? In 
recent years, judicial elections have become inappropriately heated 
and partisan affairs.154 Citizens United could operate to undermine 
state laws designed to limit the impact of campaign spending on judi-
cial elections. Worse yet, “the likely explosion of special-interest 
spending in . . . judicial races threatens to further erode the  
judiciary’s independence.”155
 While the full impact of Citizens United may not be understood for 
some time, there is much reason to be concerned. This is a decision 
that could undermine the individual’s practical ability to engage in 
speech. Furthermore, this precedent jeopardizes the political ac-
countability of our elected representatives and threatens the inde-
pendence of our judiciary. Citizens United could also be used to strike 
down scores of other valuable regulations on corporate behavior.  
VII.   CONCLUSION
 A national poll conducted shortly after the Court’s decision in Cit-
izens United demonstrated that an overwhelming majority of citi-
zens—both liberals and conservatives alike—disagree with the out-
come of the case.156 Perhaps those polled recognize what the Citizens 
United Court did not: corporate spending power poses a major threat 
to the electoral process, and corporations are not among those pro-
tected by the First Amendment. Indeed, both sentiments are accu-
rate. In reaching its decision, the Citizens United court relied on a 
theory of corporate personhood that is divorced from reality, logic, 
and constitutional history. Its holding that the First Amendment pro-
tects the political speech of corporations and persons equally is simp-
ly wrong, as the Constitution was written to guarantee the rights of 
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living persons. While the effects of Citizens United are not yet dis-
cernable, there is much reason to believe that its holding will result 
in significantly increased corporate campaign spending and severely 
decreased political responsiveness. Furthermore, there is no telling 
what other laws will now be invalidated in the name of corporate 
personhood. We know not where the Swift Boat of corporate electoral 
spending will take us, but it is likely that our destination will not be 
a pleasant one. 
